Quantitative constants for CRRA households #
The equilibrium programme runs on four explicit constants: a lower bound on the secant slope of
u (which drives the corner condition and the precautionary gain), an upper bound on it (which
gives the value function its Lipschitz constant), a bound on saving (which gives the decline
condition), and the calibration arithmetic that checks they fit together. All four were computed
for Real.log, and hu : P.u = Real.log propagated through the whole chain.
The common derivative formula hasDerivAt_crraUtility covers every γ > 0, including log,
so the marginal bounds also cover that case. The closed form crraSlopeBound is used only
when γ ≠ 1; the logarithmic slope bound is evaluated separately as 2 log 2 / m.
The one place the shape changes #
For log, marginal utility is 1/c, so the slope bound available at resources R is 1/R — it
DEGRADES as resources grow, and the multiplicative bound c ≥ R / (1 + 2G) is the right output.
For CES with γ < 1 marginal utility is c^{-γ}, and on a capped problem c ≤ maxConsumption,
so there is a single slope maxConsumption ^ (-γ) that works everywhere. That turns the same
deviation argument into a UNIFORM bound on saving — policy s ≤ K for one constant K — which
is a cleaner route to the decline condition than the multiplicative bound, and the natural asset
bound falls straight out of it.
policy_le_of_marginal_bound is stated for any u with a uniform slope bound, so log gets the
uniform version too, with m = 1 / maxConsumption.
Rational exponents reduce to integer powers #
At γ = 1 - 1/n every exponent the CES constants produce is m/n for integers m, n, and a
comparison of x ^ (m/n) against a rational is equivalent to one of x ^ m against c ^ n.
These two lemmas are the whole bridge, and they are what keeps γ near 1 arithmetically
tractable: norm_num settles the integer form.
Negative exponents without a root #
The gain and cost sides of the supply floor are both x ^ (-γ). When the base sits on the right
side of one these need no root at all: a base above one makes the power at most one, and a base
below one makes it at most the reciprocal (for γ ≤ 1). That covers the COST side of every
calibration, where the base is η + income - t with t small. The GAIN side, where the base is
small and the bound has to be large, is where a root is genuinely needed —
le_rpow_neg_of_rpow_le hands it back to rpow_le_of_pow_le.
Secant slopes of CRRA, bounded below #
The bound reaches d = 0 when γ < 1. Utility is finite there, so the statement makes
sense, and the first unit of consumption is worth at least as much as any later one. This is the
case log cannot have.
The gain from d extra consumption, bounded below. Taking R = c + d in
crra_marginal_bound gives the CES form of log_sub_log_ge.
The secant slope of CRRA on [d, c] is at most d ^ (-γ). The mirror image of
crra_marginal_bound, and what caps the COST of saving.
The cost of saving h, capped uniformly in resources. Resources are at least m, so what
is left after saving is at least m - h, and marginal utility there is the largest that can
apply. The log form of the same bound is log (m / (m - h)).
Secant slopes of CRRA, bounded above #
The closed form of slopeBound (crraUtility γ) at the income floor for γ ≠ 1.
The literal expression below evaluates to zero at γ = 1 under total real division, so
the logarithmic case uses log_slopeBoundU separately.
Instances For
A uniform bound on saving from a uniform marginal bound. Deviate to half the optimal
saving: the extra consumption is worth at least m per unit, and concavity of the continuation
caps what the forgone saving could have repaid at deviationGap, whatever the state.
The log development could not use this, because for log the available m at resources R is
1 / R, which is not uniform. It is stated generically anyway — log gets the version with
m = 1 / maxConsumption, which is uniform after all, just weaker than what the multiplicative
argument extracts. For CES with γ < 1 the uniform m = maxConsumption ^ (-γ) is all there is,
and it is enough.
The oscillation gap #
deviationGap = 2 β ‖V‖ is not translation-invariant. For CES, subtracting
1 / (1-γ) from c ^ (1-γ) / (1-γ) gives the normalization that tends to log c
as γ → 1 for positive c; it is not an equality with log c at a fixed γ ≠ 1.
A value-norm bound is sensitive to that additive utility constant. The comparisons here use
DIFFERENCES of continuation values, so an oscillation bound avoids this normalization dependence:
(u maxConsumption - u minConsumption) / (1 - β).
The spread of the value function, from the two constant plans.
Instances For
The continuation value moves by at most the oscillation gap, whatever the two saving
levels. This is what replaces 2 ‖V‖ in every comparison.
The nonlogarithmic CRRA Lipschitz constant, mirroring logLipschitz.
Equations
- P.crraLipschitz γ = LeanEconomics.crraSlopeBound γ P.minConsumption * (1 + P.interest) / (1 - ↑P.discount * (1 + P.interest))
Instances For
The value function is Lipschitz with the explicit CRRA constant for γ ≠ 1.
The borrowing constraint binds where resources are small, CES version. The threshold is
resources ^ (-γ) where the log version had 1 / resources.
The CES saving bound in closed form. Saving never exceeds 2 · deviationGap · maxConsumption ^ γ, whatever the state.
The natural asset bound for CES. A uniform cap on saving is a decline condition outright:
above it, assets fall. No linear consumption bound and no exp in sight.
The continuation's gain between two saving levels, CES version. Where the log form carries
log (1 + R·(y-x) / (income + R·x)), this carries (income + R·y) ^ (-γ) · R·(y-x): the extra
resources, valued at the marginal utility of the largest consumption they could buy.
The continuation's gain from zero, CES version.
The sharp decline constant #
crra_policy_le bounds saving by a constant, which is enough for a natural asset bound but far
too weak for the corner condition to meet it: the corner needs the threshold to be comparable to
the LOW income, and an absolute bound does not shrink with it. The log development gets a
PROPORTIONAL bound instead, c ≥ R / (1 + 2G), whose decline threshold is proportional to income.
The CES analogue deviates to θ times the optimal saving rather than to half of it, and prices
the extra consumption at the margin where it lands: b ≤ (β · oscGap / θ) · (c + (1-θ) b) ^ γ.
Taking θ near 1 makes the right-hand side nearly (β · oscGap) c ^ γ, proportional to
consumption, which is the shape the decline condition needs.
The proportional CES bound on saving.
Assets fall above an explicit threshold, in the income state that matters. The threshold
is (β · oscGap / θ) · (income z + (1 + r - θ) · assetCap) ^ γ. It depends on the
income of the selected state and the residual gross return 1 + r - θ; its strict comparison
with current assets is an explicit hypothesis.
The asset cap never binds #
not_concaveOn_consumptionFn_of_cap_binds makes Carroll and Kimball's conclusion FALSE wherever
saving reaches the cap, so the cap is the obstruction to Light's uniqueness argument, not the
utility class. It can be removed by calibration rather than by weakening the theory: run
crra_policy_le_mul by contradiction. If saving reached the cap then consumption would be at
most maxIncome + (1 + r - θ) · assetCap. The displayed inequality makes the saving upper
bound at that quantity strictly smaller than the cap.
The criterion evaluates the proportional bound at the consumption quantity implied by cap binding. The theorem retains the displayed numerical inequality as an explicit calibration hypothesis.
Related literature: Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007), Incomplete Markets, Labor Supply and Capital Accumulation. The sufficient criterion below is specific to this capped household model: it uses the displayed quantitative inequality and positive optimal consumption. Its fixed-point and iterative versions share the same comparison argument.
Saving never reaches the asset cap.
The disproof of Carroll and Kimball is disarmed. Where saving never reaches the cap, the
hypothesis of not_concaveOn_consumptionFn_of_cap_binds -- a flat stretch of the policy at the
top of the asset region -- cannot occur, so nothing in this development contradicts concavity of
the consumption function. That is not a proof of concavity; it is the removal of the obstruction
that made one impossible.
A quantitative CES saving floor, the form the sign-change argument consumes.
Positive aggregate capital for CES, from primitives alone. The log condition
log (m / (m - h)) < β · P z₁ z₀ · log (1 + R h / income z₀) becomes
(m - h) ^ (-γ) · h < β · P z₁ z₀ · (income z₀ + R h) ^ (-γ) · R h: the saved unit priced at
the margin where consumption is lowest, against its return in the bad state.