Rate uniqueness for normalized capped-log clearing #
This file combines rate monotonicity of household saving, monotonicity of stationary mean
assets and a strictly decreasing prescribed demand schedule. The log-household constants
support discount 24/25.
The prescribed normalized schedule #
normalisedDemand α δ r = α / ((1 - α) * (r + δ)) is the capital-to-wage ratio for a
Cobb–Douglas firm per unit of effective labor. The clearing equation used here equates this
schedule to mean household assets. No mean-one endowment condition or wage/asset-cap scaling
bridge to full competitive equilibrium is supplied. The result is uniqueness for this
explicit unit-wage normalized clearing problem.
Household conditions #
Transitions are monotone in income, and a lowest-income state is reached with positive
probability in one step from every state. The Tauchen construction verifies these properties
for its arbitrary positive earnings scale. The cap inequality
2β * maxIncome < (1 - β * (1 + rhi)) * cap guarantees the required saving bound across
the rate interval; the asset bounds are fixed across that family.
The prescribed normalized demand #
The prescribed unit-wage normalized demand schedule, per unit of effective labor.
Instances For
Theorem 1 on the interval, by chaining #
Saving rises with the rate on [rlo, rhi], for log utility. Local comparisons from
crra_policy_mono_withRate_of_minMPC chained by monotoneOn_of_local. For log the minimal MPC is
1 - β at every rate, so every cap condition collapses to the one on hcap.
The Doeblin chain on the interval #
The per-rate corner test, from its worst case at the top of the interval. For log the test
at rate r is β(1+r)(income z₀ + (1+r) a₀) < minIncome, increasing in r.
A unique stationary distribution at every rate in [0, rhi], for log utility.
Convergence to it from any start, at every rate in [0, rhi].
Theorem 2: capital supply is monotone #
Capital supply rises with the rate on [0, rhi], for log utility, along any selection of
stationary distributions. Light's Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3: single crossing #
The normalized clearing rate is unique on [rlo, rhi]. Two rates with stationary
household distributions whose mean assets equal the prescribed normalisedDemand α δ r
have the same rate, under the stated cap, transition and impatience hypotheses.
With the constants constructed #
The interval, the step and the corner level are not primitives of the economy. Given only that
the cap clears 2β · maxIncome / (1 - β(1+rhi)), choose the step as half the room under 1 and
the corner level as small as the corner test needs.
A slack cap supplies a positive comparison step and a corner level meeting both bounds.
Uniqueness from one inequality on the cap.
Negative rates #
The uniqueness theorems live on [0, rhi]. Below zero the minimal-MPC ceiling on capital
supply, β · maxIncome / (1 - β(1+r)), still holds for log utility — κ = 1 - β at every
rate — while Cobb--Douglas demand blows up as r ↓ -δ. Where the ceiling is below demand there
is no equilibrium.
The log capital ceiling at any admissible rate with β(1+r) < 1: no sign restriction on
r, because κ = 1 - β (minMPC_one).
No equilibrium where the ceiling is below demand.
Normalized clearing with the Aiyagari (1994) log calibration #
The constants are β = 0.96, α = 0.36 and δ = 0.08, with log utility, no borrowing,
and monotone earnings transitions reaching a lowest-income state with positive probability
in one step. The time-preference rate is λ = 1/0.96 - 1 = 1/24. The theorems concern the
prescribed normalized equation on intervals -δ < rlo ≤ rhi < λ; they do not identify it
with full competitive market clearing for arbitrary household earnings scales.
The calibrated normalized clearing rate is unique on [rlo, rhi]. The interval is
above -δ and below the time-preference rate 1/24. Earnings transitions are monotone and
reach a lowest-income state in one step; the asset cap must exceed
(48/25) · maxIncome / (1 - (24/25)(1+rhi)).
Two normalized clearing rates in (-δ, λ) coincide. The interval version is applied
to [min r₁ r₂, max r₁ r₂]; the cap condition is required at the larger rate. The clearing
hypotheses equate stationary mean household assets to the prescribed normalized demand.
No normalized clearing at a negative rate where the saving ceiling is below demand.
The ceiling–demand inequality uses the calibrated constants and is polynomial in r and
maxIncome, so it can be checked for any earnings grid.
No normalized clearing on (-δ, -1/20] when household income is at most 3/2 and
the stated asset-cap bound holds. The income bound is an explicit hypothesis in household
units; it is not inferred from a mean-one endowment normalization.